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EPISTEMIC VIRTUE, RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE, AND BELIEF

James A. Montmarquet

This paper defends the "epistemic virtuousness" at least of tentative religious
conviction based on religious experience. The virtues of' openness' and 'intellectual humility' are contrasted with the skeptic's 'closedness' and 'intellectual
hubris.'

The framework of this paper is provided by "virtue epistemology";1 its
subject is religious experience - or, more accurately, the range of suitable
belief-related attitudes to which religious experience may give rise. Its conclusions occupy a kind of middle ground - roughly equidistant, I would
judge, from the certitudes of the "true believer" and the "disinterested
agnosticism" of the nonbeliever. For it endorses an attitude primarily of
openness, of wishing to probe, even as we accept (in intellectual humility)
our cognitive limitations regarding, the mysteries of religion.
I. Epistemic Virtue.

My initial position is that one is only criticizable (in the sense of blameworthy) for one's doxastic states (beliefs or failures to believe) insofar as one is
guilty of a certain type of epistemic vice, typified by such cases as wishful
thinking, closed-mindedness, intellectual laziness, or sheer carelessness in
thinking or reasoning. These vices are appropriate bases for personal criticism insofar as they embody two central features required for - or, at the
very least, especially suited to - such criticism. First, they are subject to
one's control- one's fairly direct, albeit not complete control- and in this
regard are distinguishable from mere capacities like power of recall or
visual acuity. A person can be asked or even commanded to keep an open
mind, to pay close attention, not to jump to any hasty conclusions - but
only to "try your best" regarding the use of such capacities again as good
vision or memory. Second, such virtues bear an "internal connection" to
the central value in relation to which one is held blameworthy (in failing to
exemplify them) - that is to say, all of these vices involve some shortfall in
one's efforts (regarding truth). Thus, closed-mindedness involves a failure
to be "open" - but to what (if not the possibility of truth)? Likewise, "care"
would be a specifically epistemic virtue insofar as it involves care in arriving at correct - i.e., true - beliefs.
Other, quite different accounts have conceived epistemic virtues as
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merely qualities or capacities apt to produce true beliefs (and not to produce false ones).' This is not the place to raise issues with such theories,
except to make this one point. Our own approach - focused on a concept
of praise and blame sensitive virtues, and eschewing any particular regard
for knowledge and knowledge-yielding justification - has at least this
desirable feature. It can raise epistemic - as opposed to merely practical
- concerns regarding religious experience and belief, without almost
immediately bogging down in such stalemated issues as whether religious
experiences can be "reliable" sources of knowledge - or whether, more
generally, they may provide such "justification" as would be required for
knowledge. Along these lines, we are able to mount an original defense of
religious belief - without falling into 'mere pragmatism' (views merely that
we are "better off" - say, happier or more apt to produce happiness for
others - with these convictions).
A second main feature of my working account of epistemic virtue should
be mentioned here at the start, as it will emerge later as quite central to my
argument. Assignments of epistemic virtue and vice - and epistemic
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness - must be regarded as context sensitive, and especially as sensitive to considerations of moral risk. Thus, take
the case of Leopold Bloom of Ulysses fame, strolling about Dublin forming
all sorts of beliefs: some spontaneous, some born of a bit of reflection, some
quite ridiculous, some quite ordinary. Now, from an intuitive standpoint, I
do not think that we want to judge Bloom as "blameworthy" - morally or in
any other way - even for his more casually or carelessly formed beliefs. I
explain this intuition by citing the obvious: there is no evident reason for
Bloom to be more careful, more discerning, or more skeptical in his interior
monologue. Even in his more ridiculous beliefs, Bloom is, I would add, not
really all that different from the rest of us - were our ("unedited") stream
of consciousness to be held up to public view.
If, then, Bloom should say to himself, "Why, that's Paddy McGuire over
there" - only to hastily correct himself when the person comes into much
fuller view - ordinarily we would not "blame" or otherwise chastise him
for the first belief. But, of course, if Bloom is in the process of pointing out
Paddy for a Sinn Fein sniper (who will shoot immediately on Bloom's
hand-signaled identification), everything changes. Even if Bloom feels
quite certain, at the original distance, that this is Paddy, we will fault him
for his too hasty certainty - all the more if it is attributable to his longstanding personal dislike of McGuire. In this case, great care - and certainly a
control of one's personal biases - is required, and Bloom has greatly fallen
short in both regards.
The point, then, is that, broadly speaking, our estimations of whether
some blameworthy shortfall of virtue has taken place will be relative to
such act or acts as may be in prospect - and what their foreseeable consequences may be. This will lead to a second advantage of the approach
taken here. Although our concern is with the epistemic and not the moral
value of religious experience and belief, we are able to explore one very
close link between narrowly epistemic and larger moral concerns in this
regard. Even if one denies, as I would deny, that the knowledge-status of
religious beliefs depends on what acts one may be contemplating based
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thereupon, it must be plausible, or very much more plausible, to hold that
how much care, open-mindedness and other such virtues as may be
required in forming (or continuing to hold) a given belief - that this will
depend on such essentially practical considerations as the likely moral consequences of one's being in error. 3
This has a second liberating effect. It allows a fairly liberal standard for
virtue and praiseworthiness in the case of religious belief - roughly, as
long as no morally risky acts are going to be predicated on such beliefs. It
offers, one could even say, a measure of doxastic freedom - but at the
expense of risky, religiously based acts. Just as Bloom is not held to a very
high standard of virtue until such point as serious negative consequences
may ensue if he is wrong, the "model believer" contemplated here - open,
humble and possessed of other relevant virtues - has considerable latitude,
roughly, until such point as what she contemplates could be morally dangerous.
II. Religious Experience

We tum now to "religious experience," a dauntingly wide, ill-defined, and
variously approached territory. Here I will follow William James in The
Varieties of Religious Experience" in not attempting to define so much as to
focus matters. James himself 'defines' not religious experience, but religion
itself, as
the feelings, acts and individual experiences of individual men so far
as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they
may consider the divine (39).
This, however, serves James as a characterization mainly of religious
experience, for he takes such experiences to represent the core of what is
truly valuable, distinctive, and intellectually interesting in this subject. For
my part, without rejecting this or any other characterization, I shall want to
focus things a bit more narrowly. In particular, I want to begin with the
following distinction. There may be occasions when the depth of one's
religious response is entirely intelligible, given the apparently miraculous
nature of what one has just witnessed. In other cases, however, an individual may have an experience in the context of religious worship, where the
very depth and intensity of the experience is itself an important part of
what leads one - of course the ostensible object of these experiences would
be another - to make an affirmation of its supernatural character.'
This is not an experience of the miraculous - though one might sometimes want to describe such a thing as a "miraculous experience." More
particularly, I am interested in these two other, likely aspects of such experiences:
First, such features of them as are "numinous" (to use the famous appellation of Rudolph Ottd) - as are apt to arouse such strong feelings as awe,
wonder, and dread, what Otto picturesquely describes as the experience of
the "mysterium tremendum."
Second, and along the same lines, I am interested in such aspects of
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these experiences as may give rise to deep feelings of mystery - not of definite answers so much as haunting questions. Such experiences will not
strike one as "revelatory" but will, at most, leave one with an impression of
having "seen through a glass darkly." They will occasion, even demand,
further reflection - not because they reveal answers, but because of the
way in which they do not. If they do not reveal, they suggest; if they do
not deliver anything, they promise much.

III. The virtue of 'openness' - and a vice of skepticism
"The mystic is, in short, invulnerable, and must be left, whether we
relish it or not, in undisturbed enjoyment of his creed ... But I now
proceed to add that mystics have no right to claim that we ought to
accept the deliverance of their peculiar experiences, if we are ourselves outsiders and feel no private call thereto." (Wm. James,
Varieties, 415)
What is an epistemically responsible attitude not to mystical experiences
but to the kind of more ordinary experiences characterized in the previous
section?? Even here, I want to say that something like James' distinction is
helpful - but as applied to the subject herself. When such religious experiences are going on, it is hard to speak of "epistemic virtue" at all, for to
expect the subject to adopt a stance, even of the mildest scrutiny - lest she
not affirm something that is not true - would be to interfere greatly with
the experience (as a specifically religious one). While they are continuing,
her experiences are, as James would say, "authoritative" for her. This is
not to say that, during such episodes, the mind is somehow powerless to
exert special efforts of "epistemic scrutiny" for that is certainly not so.
Again, the point would rather be that inasmuch as such states are genuinely to be experienced, one ought not to do anything whose effect would be
greatly interfering with their natural and normal character.
Nor can the issue be one of our being required to enter into such experiences for "pure" (affectively neutral, merely truth-investigating) motives, as
this, too, could but have a very limiting, not to say, injurious, effect on
these experiences (again, as specifically religious ones).8 Some experiences
need to be entered into - really can only be satisfactorily appreciated as
experiences - if they are entered into for motives specific to them, and not
ones merely of curiosity or investigative intent. Certainly, in the case of
love, one who tried to fall in love, but mainly just to see "what the experience was like" would likely fail - or if he did succeed, would certainly
have distorted the experience of love (as long as he maintained this observer's stance). Thus, in the end, a primary commitment to the observer's role
generates a paradox: we are at best distorting the very thing a commitment
to truth would have us accurately represent.
The most important issue, then, must surely concern what attitudes an
epistemically virtuous individual would take in reference to such experiences when she is neither in nor about to enter into them - in particular,
when she is reflecting (in a calm moment) about them. Should one, for
instance, have a positive, encouraging attitude, perhaps doing such things
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and encouraging such states of mind as might support or reinforce the
effects of their previous occurrence (or even add to the likelihood of their
occurrence in the future); or should one take a more cautious, even a suspicious or hostile, attitude?
My first suggestion would be this. A measure of openness to such experiences surely would be epistemically virtuous; a corresponding "closedmindedness" would be a vice. Obviously, openness is (open-mindedness)
is itself an epistemic virtue (and closed-mindedness is, in its general tendency a vice). Beyond that, openness in this specific case promises, at the
very least, to reveal aspects of ourselves - and of the nature of our own
responses in an environment in which deep mysteries, and at least vague,
incomplete answers to these mysteries may be experienced. Even if we
remain noncommittal as to the ultimate truth of these "answers," a measure of openness to them - so long as it is not carried to the point of interfering with other, definite good things - would surely be appropriate.
Openness, after all, requires only the promise - and not necessarily the
proof - of epistemic rewards.
In this regard, a skeptic who refused to put himself in situations in
which he was apt to have such experiences would seem to be just as
"closed-minded" as a believer who refused to consider skeptical arguments or anything apt to disturb her faith. Neither would appear to be
exactly virtuous, from the standpoint of truth and inquiry. Our skeptic
may complain that, unlike the other, he is open to every argument and position - but this would seem very much an unduly "intellectualist" or "antiexperiential" attitude. What would we say, correspondingly, of one who
disdained all sexual activity but was steadfastly "open" to arguments, pro
and con, about the value of this? (Perhaps there is a moral or prudential
case to be made for his stance, but there is not much to be said for it epistemically) We do know that some things have to be experienced, in order to
assess their true value. 9
My charge against the skeptic, then, amounts to this: "openness" to the
supernatural (or the possibility thereof) involves more than openness to
arguments. 1O To this, the skeptic may retort that in being open to all such
arguments, one is being open to all such evidence that religious experiences
may yield. But I can think of two fairly telling replies to this:
First, any argument will at best propositionally encode certain aspects of
an experience. If the argument is "pro-religious faith," it will encode such
aspects as would appear to favor that conclusion. But if "one picture is
worth a thousand words," one experience must be many times richer
("informationally" and not just "experientially" - than its propositional
description). Thus, any claim that one is considering via arguments, "all
such evidence that such experiences may yield" will be mistaken In failing to experience the full richness of "the real thing," one is only taking
cognizance of a very impoverished version of this richness.
Second, even such talk of "evidence" begs more fundamental questions
concerning the nature of the decision process involved in partaking of relevant experiences. Not every rational decision procedure, we must remind
ourselves, is one of argument and the consideration of arguments. In certain quite important areas of life, decision is more a matter of having rele-
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vant experiences, reflecting on those experiences (including considering
relevant arguments), and then, more passively, just seeing what choice
"sits best with one." A decision process may certainly include the
appraisal of relevant arguments - without reducible to mere consideration
of arguments.
To expand on this last idea, certainly some choices (e.g., among rival
scientific hypotheses) may consist in mere argument appraisals, but others
- say, the choice of a mate - will not. Some choices - most notably, this
last one - are such that one must quite literally "live with" the results.
Such a choice may happen to coincide with the conclusion of an argument,
but there is no guarantee that this happy result will obtain. If the conclusion of an argument is something one cannot seem to live with, of course
one possibility is to adjust one's choice to that conclusion. But this cannot
be the right solution to any and all such cases - especially not when one
has considered and given some weight to the various arguments, and still
finds oneself fundamentally dissatisfied. In the case of choosing a mate,
the point is of course clear: even if a seemingly irrefutable argument
should select A, if one still finds oneself fundamentally resisting this choice
in favor of B, at some point it becomes, I would think, a mere irrational
prejudice in favor of "arguments" not to resist,'!

IV. Intellectual humility
My next point would concern such attitudes as wonder and awe - characteristic of the "numinous" experience alluded to earlier. These are notable
for my project partly because they involve experiences likely to prompt
belief in the non-argumentative manner just discussed. That is, such experiences might easily lead one to a state of belief - might easily lead an
embrace of the supernatural as something that ultimately "sits well" with
one (or "sits better" with one than a lack of such embrace) - but without
necessarily providing an argument to that ef£ectY
Yet, there is another way in which "the numinous" is important in this
connection. Feelings of awe, wonder, and the like are salutary in helping to
induce a certain type of "intellectual humility" (alluded to earlier). Now,
humility in matters religious has traditionally, and rightly, been understood
mainly as a moral virtue. Partly as a result of this, intellectual humility,
unfortunately, has been neglected in the processY Such humility would
involve, mainly, I suggest, a profound sense of the limited powers of what
one knows - and can know from one's rather small position relative to the
immensity and complexity of the physical universe - and to what might
involve an even greater disparity: between the limitations of one's own spiritual powers and the possible immensity of the spiritual universe.
Thus, such humility is deeply connected to experiences of the" mysterium
tremendum" for these may easily impress such disparities on one - without
any paradoxical claim that one "knows" or adequately comprehends their
dimensions. Notice, too, that such humility has a further implication in the
present connection. The skeptic is pleased to reflect on our limited powers
of knowing, and the relative unlikelihood that the world as it is will happen to coincide with the world as we take it to be. Yet the skeptic'S "humil-
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ity" bears the seeds of a kind of intellectual hubris. For the skeptic takes
certain considerations as exempting him from such experiences and, more
generally, such "practices" by which persons have sought God. That
"there may be more things in heaven and on earth than are dreamt of in
your philosophy" can be, in its opposition to the skeptical philosopher, a
legitimate expression of intellectual humility. The opposed attitude - that
there are no such things, or even, that I refuse to engage in such experiences as might alter my perspective on this possibility - may be correspondingly taken as an expression of intellectual arrogance.

V. Belief
Seen in this light, then, a patient, continuing interest in religious experiences, a wish to probe them, an openness to, and an intellectual humility
regarding, the distinctive experiences of the "numinous" may reasonably
be taken as intellectually virtuous. But now we should focus more narrowlyon what is surely the most important of cognitive attitudes: belief(including degrees thereof)? What does epistemic responsibility call for here?
Certainly, one would not want to claim here that such experiences, even
if they induce belief in the supernatural during their occurrence, should be
reflectively comprehended with full belief in their supernatural aspects. Just
because one has had an experience of "Jesus giving one assurance," this
does not mean that one should be reflectively convinced that this is exactly
what has happened. For that would likely evince a rather hasty, precipitate - and one could even say, an intellectually impatient attitude toward
the objects of religious belief. It would defeat, or go completely against the
grain of, the kind of exploratory, open attitude we have been extolling - for
it would be as though one already "had the answer" or an important part
of the answer. Here I might again quote William James, as his attitude is
precisely the one I wish to endorse:
I reject this dogmatic ideal not out of perverse delight in intellectual
instability. I am no lover of disorder and doubt as such. Rather do I
fear to lose tmth by this pretension to possess it already wholly. That
we can gain more of it by moving in the right direction, I believe as
much as anyone... (Varieties, 327)
My 'Jamesian' ideal learner, then, might be described as a kind of "wise
beginner" (just the opposite of the "wise fool" of sophomoric tendencies).
She does not and, as learner, will not give full assent to a story, of which he
has, in all likelihood, experienced, only a part. Too much evidently
remains to be experienced for her to reach any very hard and fast conclusions concerning the exact nature of what she has experienced to date. She
is "wise" inasmuch as one is approaching this as a reflective adult, not a
mere child. Yet she does preserve something of the kind of "childlike wonder" - characteristic even of such scientific minds as Albert Einstein and
Richard Feynman. 14 If our wise beginner moves forward, it is with
extreme caution; if she is learning, she is more impressed with how much
she has not learned or even begun to understand.
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In addition, notice that our wise beginner, insofar as she is epistemically
virtuous, will contemplate doing nothing of a morally risky nature - say,
"persecuting heretics" or even voting for a "born again" candidate whose
political agenda seems morally questionable. For one thing, she is far too
insecure in her incipient convictions to undertake acts that would qualify
as morally bad - should those convictions prove false. Also, since the acts
she contemplates, based on whatever tentative convictions she may possess - since these acts are morally very safe, recall that the appropriate standards of epistemic virtue for the beliefs underlying such acts will be relatively modest, and ones she will easily have met. If she thinks that God
has revealed himself in an experience of hers, she may quite safely pray
that this will happen again. Obviously, such an act (her prayer) - no matter what the status of its underlying belief - can do little or no harm.
Insofar, then, as this "safety first" policy remains in effect, a kind of limited
doxastic freedom will obtain. One's initial openness may well lead to some
level of perhaps quite tentative commitment. Even if such initial credence
is not actively challenged, or scrutinized, in times of reflection - it is not
clear that such challenge or scrutiny is particularly called for. Certainly the
kind of intense critical examination as might cause one to lose all conviction would not be - as long as merely safe acts are contemplated.
But, of course, this is not to say at all that full conviction is called for here
- or that full conviction would be "virtuous." For full conviction involves a
double difficulty in this connection:
(i) Even if one contemplates no particular acts, the mere fact of one's
being convinced - I think we can say, based in part on the lessons of history - the mere fact of one's being quite certain of a religious belief, this carries serious moral risks. For even if no particular act is contemplated, situations in which one might act to the disadvantage of those not sharing
one's beliefs, these could well arise.
(ii) At the same time, given the rather limited experiences available to
our "wise beginner," full conviction is certainly apt to have been purchased by epistemically unvirtuous means - e.g., focusing closed-mindedly only on reasons one has to take one's experiences as "veridical" or as
confirming some particular religion, deliberately shunning the company of
those who might question one's convictions, and so forth.
It is important to recognize, then, that as one's degree of certainty
increases, two separate factors conspire, or are apt to have conspired, to
work against the virtue of one's belief state. Just as a higher level of virtue
would be required of one, the likelihood is that one is exhibiting actually
exhibiting a lower and not a higher level. By the same token, our wise
beginner's more hesitant, probing, openness to religious mystery - this
would be doubly endorsed: as an expression of relatively high virtue in
proportion to moral risk.

VI. Faith
We have thus far taken care not to let our "beginner" take on too much for
herself, either in terms of what he believes or does. But, especially on the
side of belief, this may leave her, and the present theory, open to the fol-
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lowing objection, likely to emanate from the defender of faith and full conviction:
Religious experience can and should give rise to religious belief. But
this can only happen via faith. Without faith, there is no genuinely
progressive element to lead us deeper, further into the mysteries of
religion and religious experience. Without faith, we remain 'beginners' (as you say), we can continue to probe the edges; but we are not
making intellectual or emotional progress. There is, as one might put
it, a "dialectic" between experience and faith: experience helps to
induce faith; but without faith itself, experience remains merely tentative and therefore, even as experience, much less profound that it
would otherwise be. You, however, seem willing to endorse only the
first element of this dialectic; you allow experience to induce perhaps
some small element of faith; but you do not allow a separate act of
faith to induce and enrich experience.
How, then, will our "wise beginner" ever advance, ever become more
than a mere beginner? Here I begin by throwing the question back to my
fideistic critic. How, relative to our discussion of epistemically virtuous
and unvirtuous ways of proceeding, does this critic want her (the wise
beginner) to proceed?
We must suppose, first off, that this objector is not suggesting that our
beginner adopt un virtuous strategies, e.g., ignoring arguments against her
incipient convictions, and so forth. For any such suggestion would have
but, as Russell used to say, "the advantages of theft over honest toiL"
Nor can we suppose that the suggestion is that she should, as it were,
"become convinced by a sheer act of will." Obviously, it is hardly clear
that this is possible - and even if it were, hardly clear that this would
express anything like a virtuous tendency.
Still, there is the possibility that our wise beginner might simply affirm and be called upon by our objector to affirm - regularly what she only
partly believes. This, in contrast to the preceding, seems quite a reasonable
suggestion, as such affirmation, in the first place, would be subject to one's
control, and would not have to be epistemically unvirtuous at all.
Affirming, after all, is an act - as much subject to one's control as any other
act. Moreover, such affirmation seemingly could be offered by our beginner in full cognizance of the limitations of her experiences. In general,
notice, one may quite easily affirm - in the face of evidentiary difficulties something of which one might only have become fully convinced by
means of wishful thinking or other epistemic vices. I can tell myself "I am
going to jump that wall" - temporarily blocking out, but not unvirtuously,
the evidence against this. By contrast, the corresponding stable conviction
(that I will jump that wall) might need to be purchased by wishful thinking
or other epistemic vices.15
Here, however, a difficulty would seem to arise. Even if we allow that
one may virtuously affirm a proposition for such limited, short-term purposes as jumping a fence, may one virtuously do this in order to alter, to
deepen, one's beliefs? My answer is this. Up to a point, it is not unvirtuous
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to strengthen such convictions by affirmation - not, at least, when one is
simply attempting to resist the natural erosion of conviction, following the
dying of such experiences as may have excited it. Mere passage of time
will, as a matter of plain fact, tend to diminish convictions born of unusual
experiences. But mere passage of time does not, as such, render such convictions any more, or any less, solidly founded. Now, to be sure, it is
unvirtuous to suppress the natural consequences of time - when these give
rise to questioning reflections; that, however, is not what we are endorsing.
The idea is merely that the encroachments of time may, to a degree, be virtuously resisted - and that affirmation can help to playa role in this regard.
Affirmation, then, may surely be viewed as an episternically virtuous, or
certainly not unvirtuous, response to time and its effects. But there is
another highly relevant consideration here, which is the contextuality of
assessments of epistemic virtue. We have already indicated that, as one's
religious convictions might approach complete certainty, two factors ones of moral risk and of virtue - conspire to make one's epistemic position more perilous. As we have also indicated, however, at the lower
ranges of the scale of conviction, one gets a much freer rein from a virtue
standpoint - and this would certainly apply to the case at hand (that of
affirmation). So long as our wise beginner avoids morally risky acts (based
on her incipient convictions), there is no reason why, up to a point, she cannot effect increases in her degree of conviction - within safe virtue parameters. If it is still wrong (unvirtuous) for her to rigorously suppress all
doubts and considerations apt to lead her to doubt, it is hardly clear that
the relative absence of such doubts and doubting reflections, and the gentle
encouragement of belief - that this must be counted unvirtuous, at least at
this stage of conviction.
In short, then, some progress, clearly, will be possible for our beginner.
To be sure, this progress will be slow - and will predictably become much
slower as her degree of conviction increases. (Something like the doxastic
equivalent of "diminishing returns" will apply.) But, at the end of the day,
may it not be that a lack of rapid progress is simply part of the price of
maintaining one's virtue - in matters of faith and belief (as much as in
morals)? Presumably, there is no available, epistemically virtuous "short
cut" to full religious conviction.

VII. Against the skeptic - again
On our other flank, however, the skeptic has been lying in wait. At this
point, he may simply wish to maintain that if religious experience cannot
yield, or be shown to yield, epistemic justification, and thus knowledge it is of no real epistemic value and thus, such "virtues" as it may embody
must be merely practical and not epistemic after all.
To this implicit dilemma - either knowledge-yielding or not epistemically relevant at all - I reply as follows. Even a skeptic - no, especially a
skeptic - must be sensitive to the point that if the beliefs on which we
presently base our actions should prove false or epistemically unjustified,
we still need to be able to allow that we have been entitled (epistemically)
to act on them - or some of them, at any rate. In other words, we still need
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to be able to allow that these beliefs (or some of them) possessed sufficient
epistemic credentials of some sort for our acts to be "justified" - to have
whatever sort of moral credential they would not possess in the absence of
this epistemic credential. My solution to this is to treat virtue as, in effect,
"practically justifying" acts (based on a given set of beliefs.) The skeptic,
quite obviously, owes us an account of his own.
The skeptic may now deploy this new line of argument. "I will allow,
what is a mere tautology, that when acting on religious belief will do no
harm, there is nothing ethically wrong with acting on such beliefs - but this
fails to distinguish them from plainly just silly beliefs (e.g., in the "tooth
fairy") - as long as they, too, are practically harmless."
The answer, or short answer, to this difficulty would be to contrast the
rootedness of religious belief in experience with the lack of that type of rootedness of "silly" or "arbitrary" beliefs (however harmless). The "tooth
fairy" will, no doubt, have had her (or his) day, and those with "faith" in
this being will perhaps have had associated experiences - but, ultimately, it
will be the very limited character of these in the life of children that marks
this as "silly" - and not truly, or very deeply, religious in character.
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NOTES
1. For a fuller statement of my views on this matter, see my Epistemic Virtue
and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993); and "An
Internalist Theory of Epistemic Virtue," in Guy Axtell, ed., Knowledge, Belief, and
Character (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
2. I refer here, most prominently, to the views of Alvin Goldman, e.g., in such
classic papers as "What is Reliable Belief?" in George Pappas, ed. Justification and
Knowledge (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1979) and Ernest Sosa's virtue-oriented
reliabilism, e.g., in his classic, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge UP.,
1991). The source of Goldman's own virtue epistemology is "Epistemic Folkways
and Scientific Epistemology," in Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Social Sciences
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992)
3. In his famous "Ethics of Belief," essay, William Gifford writes: 'If a belief is
not realized immediately in open deeds, it is stored for guidance of the future ....
No real belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant; it prepares us for more of its like, confirms those which resembled it before,
and weakens others; and so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts
which may some day explode into action and leave its stamp on our character forever.' This is reprinted (e.g.) in Louis Pojman, ed. The Theory of Knowledge (Belmont,
Ca.: Wadsworth, 1993), p. 502}. However, even if we suppose all of Gifford's contentions here to be true, this hardly shows that we must, regardless of what acts we
are able to foresee, and for such purely general reasons as Clifford proposes, pay
special regard to each and every belief that we may happen to form, lest we believe
wrongly. Such a policy, besides being impossible to carry out, would in many
cases be counter-productive. As Bloom meditates on some triviality, a trolley may
run over his foot.
4. Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Barnes and Nobel, 2004), reprint
of the 1902 version; page references to the former volume are inserted parenthetically.
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5. William Hasker, "The Epistemic Value of Religious Experience," in Thomas
Senor, ed., The Rntionality of Belief and the Plurality of Faiths: Essays in Honor of William
P. Alston (Ithaca: Cornell u.P, 1995), makes a helpful distinction between two types
of epistemological appeal to "religious experience": construing it as a perception of
religious objects; and construing it as something whose best explanation appeals to
these same objects. In a sense, my own view inclines to the latter, but with this
important reservation: I am not interested in this as a type of "argument from experience" so much as a description of what I will eventually defend as a "virtuous
tendency" (to believe).
6. The Idea of the Holy, John Harvey tr. (Oxford: Oxford UP., 1950).
7. This, by the way, is not to suggest that only experiences describable as
broadly 'mystical' or' numinous' might qualify as religious. For quite an account
of the range of this topic, see, for instance, Ann Taves, Fits, Trances and Visions:
Experiencing Religion and Explaining Experiellce from Wesley to James (Princeton:
Princeton u.P., 1999).
8. Here perhaps "truth-seeking" should be distinguished from "investigative." The latter would be disruptive of religious experience, the former not. Linda
Zagzebski has made a relevant distinction, here, between merely wishing to have a
certain belief (what would be irresponsible, unvirtuous) and wishing that a certain
thing be true (what need not be irresponsible at all). If I call to find out the result of
a game on which I have bet my life savings, presumably I seek to know the true
result - yet though I am hardly neutral on this outcome. I am not "merely investigating" but that does not make my conduct intellectually irresponsible. See her discussion in "Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth," in Zagzebski and M.
DePaul, eds., Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: Oxford u.P., 2003).
9. To be sure, a celibate who, relying on the testimony of others, granted a certain "experiential value" to sexual things may not be "closed-minded" at all, for
there is nothing wrong, in such matters, with relying on the testimony of others so long as one is not using the absence of personal experiences to reach a conclusion that seems to depend specifically on that absence.
10. I suppose here, purely for the sake of argument, that such contemporary
defenders of arguments from experience - see (e.g.) William Alston, Perceiving God:
The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca: Cornell UP.,1991); Carolyn Franks
Davis, The Evidentiary Force of Religious Experience (Oxford: Oxford V.P., 1989); Keith
Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge u.P., 1993);
and Richard Swinburne, The Exis tence of God (Oxford: Oxford V.P., 1979) - have not
made their case. I hold no brief against these authors, except to insist, for reasons I
develop here, that the resources of experiential appeals are not limited to arguments.
11. Of course, some might say that at some point one's preference becomes a
kind of argument for itself. The fact that one is fundamentally dissatisfied with all
other conclusions becomes itself an argument favoring a certain choice. That, however, basically concedes the point I wish to make: that one's preference must sometimes hold sway - at least where it is back by suitable experiences.
12. This is not to say that there could not be such an argument. See in this
regard Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience.
13. Even such a thorough theistic philosopher as Robert C. Roberts offers an
account of intellectual humility pitched entirely to rather mundane concerns like
one's absence of excessive desires for professional status, and so forth. See Roberts
and W. Jay Wood, "Humility and Intellectual Goods," in L. Zagzebski and M.
DePaul, eds., Intellectual Virtue.
14. An interesting account of a graduate student's encounter with Feynman
still child-like in old age is Leonard Mldinow's Feynman's Rainbow: A Search for
Beauty in Physics and in Life (New York: Warner Books, 2003). Another relevant sub-
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ject, both here and regarding our earlier discussion of "humility" is G.E. Moore,
whose child-like delight and interest in the objections of even the most inexperienced students to his most carefully drawn philosophical positions was legendary.
Roberts and Wood, op. cit., p. 262, discuss Moore's humility.
15. Here it could be objected that even such common practices are "telling
yourself you can do it" involve epistemic vice insofar as they temporarily, at least,
focus only on the reasons on one side. But this, I think, loses sight of the larger
point, which is that our notion of epistemic virtue must ultimately tie in with our
intuitions governing morality and the long temlS prospects of having true beliefs
about the world. At the point that such first-person encouragement involves a
degree of conviction that could lead one to take morally risky acts, then, I think, we
must be concerned about its epistemic virtuousness or lack thereof. Likewise, at
the point at which such affirmations threaten one's longer terms possession of true
beliefs, we must be concerned. But neither of these is, in point of fact, threatened
by such affirmations as "I will jump that wall" - especially when a tiger pursues.
One might compare, in this connection, L.J. Cohen's distinction between "acceptance" and belief, properly so-called, "Belief and Acceptance," Mind 98 (1989), p.
368. My notion of "affirmation" would be equivalent, I suppose, to a kind of Ifact of
acceptance," in Cohen's terms.

